Welfarism
We seek to be altruistic—selfless, the contra to ego—yet the means by which we do this are not grounded upon these “fundamental axioms.” Standing upon Singer’s utilitarian framework of complete moral impartiality, we happily stomp on cockroaches and electrocute shrimp en masse (we consider this preferable). Wild existence is predatory and wholly suffering (vegetarian diets do not prevent this, and turning everybody vegan is not feasible); thus, is the moral resolution of feral beings death? Where are we to define the lower bound of expected living welfare at which we seek to preserve life? The lion will eat the zebra inherently, as will a Kiwi eat lamb. Most of us seem to have chosen the most destitute of our fellow humans as our lower bound. Why, then, do we believe that human welfare is an appropriate objective function? If we make a comparison with the animal kingdom (assuming we are disjoint), a key discrepancy is that we, for the most part, do not kill each other for food, can communicate articulately, and are self-reliant, etc. This is intelligence.
Intelligence is the determinant from which we derive our empathy, such that I do not kill a pigeon when I am hungry. We (some) have the capacity for hypotheticals (I would not want to be the pigeon). This perspective prevents me from falling into human-centric moral descriptivism; concrete morality is not a prerequisite for sentience, and we ourselves do not possess it as we do not all possess the "divine spark". We can be somewhat impartial; unlike us, we assume the animal is absolutely hylic, but to a varying degree, we are too. Do we interfere in suffering or allow the irrational, physical universe to proceed? Our imperfect intelligence cannot answer this. Why then, should we play the God figure? Both in the demiurgal imposition of suffering (ie factory farming) and unfeasible longtermist solutions to irrational, natural order.